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Abstract
In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141-146]
is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses to every possible belief
restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403-414]
relax this condition by only requiring the presence of at least one best response to such a
belief. The purpose of this paper is to provide sufficient conditions under which minimal
prep sets give sharp predictions. These conditions are satisfied in many economically
relevant classes of games, including supermodular games, potential games, and congestion
games with player-specific payoffs. In these classes, minimal curb sets generically have
a large cutting power as well, although it is shown that there are relevant subclasses of
coordination games and congestion games where minimal curb sets have no cutting power
at all and simply consist of the entire strategy space.
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Set-valued coarsenings of the Nash equilibrium concept have proven to possess a num-
ber of appealing properties. For instance, set-valued solutions adequately model the in-
tuition that people live by rules and principles (rules of thumb, the Ten Commandments,
teetotalism, etc.) that restrict behavior without determining it uniquely, and they provide
a characterization of the limit behavior of many plausible models of strategy adjustment,
cf. Hurkens (1995), Young (1998), Kosfeld et al. (2002), Tercieux (2004), and Kets and
Voorneveld (2005).
Set-valued solutions, however, may provide very unsharp predictions: non-equilibrium
strategies may be included and in some games the solution may have no cutting power
whatsoever and simply consist of the entire strategy space. Hence, to evaluate the prac-
tical appeal of such concepts, it is important to provide economically relevant classes of
games where they have considerable cutting power.
The current paper focusses on the cutting power of minimal prep sets (‘prep’ is short for
‘preparation’). This set-valued solution concept, introduced in Voorneveld (2004, 2005),
combines a standard rationality condition, stating that the set of recommended strategies
to each player must contain at least one best reply to whatever belief he may have that is
consistent with the recommendations to the other players, with players’ aim at simplicity,
which encourages them to select a set of strategies that is as small as possible. This
distinguishes minimal prep sets from (a) minimal curb sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991),
which are product sets of pure strategies containing not just some, but all best responses
to beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players, and (b) persistent
retracts (Kalai and Samet, 1984), which also require the recommendations to each player
to contain at least one best reply to beliefs in a small neighborhood of the beliefs restricted
to the recommendations to the other players. Voorneveld (2004, 2005) gives a general
existence proof and provides relations with Nash equilibria, rationalizability, minimal curb
sets, and persistent retracts. Voorneveld et al. (2005) provide axiomatizations of minimal
prep sets and minimal curb sets. Kets and Voorneveld (2005) show that appealing models
of strategic adjustment eventually settle down in minimal prep sets.
The main results of this paper are the following. Proposition 3.1 provides sufficient
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conditions under which the collection of minimal prep sets coincides with the collection of
pure Nash equilibria. After a simple illustration of this result by means of a classical pure
saddle-point theorem of Shapley (1964) for zero-sum games, it is shown to apply to two
well-known classes of games which together cover a large range of economic applications.
The first class, studied in Section 4, consists of supermodular games, games where
the best-response correspondences have certain monotonicity properties (Topkis, 1978).
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Topkis (1998) provide numerous applications, including
search models, facility location, arms races, and oligopoly models.
The second class, studied in Section 5, consists of potential games, in particular the
most general class of potential games of Monderer and Shapley (1996) and the best-
response potential games of Voorneveld (2000). These potential games have applications
to, for instance, congestion games (Rosenthal, 1973), oligopoly models (Slade, 1994),
coalition formation (Slikker, 2001), and the financing of public goods (Koster et al., 2003).
Section 5.3 extends the analysis to the congestion games of Quint and Shubik (1994),
which are typically not potential games.
When in comes to the cutting power of minimal curb sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991) in
these classes of games, the results come in two variations. Firstly, in generic finite games
belonging to these two classes of supermodular and potential games, the collections of
minimal curb sets, minimal prep sets, pure Nash equilibria, and strict Nash equilibria all
coincide; see Propositions 4.2 and 5.2. This has an important consequence, since it is
within minimal curb sets that many intuitive models of strategic adjustment settle down.
Hence, in generic finite supermodular or potential games, these processes necessarily con-
verge toward a strict Nash equilibrium.
Secondly, although these genericity results are of interest in their own right, many
classes of games have additional structure, making them nongeneric. To enhance this
point, we also provide practically relevant subclasses of games where minimal prep sets
give sharp predictions, whereas minimal curb sets have no cutting power whatsoever and
simply consist of the entire strategy space: a class of coordination games in Section 4.3
and a class of minority games in Section 5.2. Minority games model situations where
players strive to be in the most exclusive of two groups, for one of many possible reasons:
standing out from the crowd might give status; one would prefer to choose the less crowded
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of two roads to work; if demand for a good is larger than supply, one would rather be
a supplier, etc. See Moro (2003) for an introduction to minority games and Challet et
al. (2004) for a book containing many of the path-breaking papers and applications to
phenomena in financial markets.
The material is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries. In Section 3
we provide sufficient conditions for the collection of minimal prep sets and the collection
of pure Nash equilibria to coincide and a give a simple illustration in the setting of zero-
sum games. Applications to supermodular games are given in Section 4, applications to
potential games and the congestion games of Quint and Shubik (1994) in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
A (strategic) game is a tuple G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉, where N is a nonempty, finite
set of players, each player i ∈ N has a nonempty set of pure strategies (or actions) Ai
and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : ×j∈N Aj → R. A game is finite if
each player has a finite set of pure strategies. Write A = ×i∈N Ai and for each i ∈ N ,
A−i = ×j∈N\{i} Aj.
Payoffs are extended to mixed strategies in the usual way. Assuming each Ai to be a
topological space, ∆(Ai) denotes the set of Borel probability measures over Ai. Using a
common, minor abuse of notation, α−i denotes both an element of ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj) speci-
fying a profile of mixed strategies of the opponents of player i ∈ N , and the probability
measure it induces over the set A−i of pure strategy profiles of his opponents. Beliefs of
player i take the form of such a mixed strategy profile. Similarly, if Bi ⊆ Ai is a Borel
set, then ∆(Bi) denotes the set of Borel probability measures with support in Bi:
∆(Bi) = {αi ∈ ∆(Ai) | αi(Bi) = 1}.
As usual, (ai, α−i) is the profile of strategies where player i ∈ N plays ai ∈ Ai and his op-
ponents play according to the mixed strategy profile α−i = (αj)j∈N\{i} ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj).
Let Γ denote the set of all games satisfying the following weak measurability as-
sumption on the players’ utility functions: for each player i ∈ N , for each ai ∈ Ai and
each α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj), the expected payoff ui(ai, α−i) =
∫
A−i
ui(ai, a−i) dα−i is well-
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defined and finite. The set Γ contains, in particular, all (mixed extensions of) finite
strategic games.
Let i ∈ N and let α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj) be a belief of player i. The set
BRi(α−i) = {ai ∈ Ai | ∀bi ∈ Ai : ui(ai, α−i) ≥ ui(bi, α−i)}
is the set of pure best responses of player i against α−i.
We recall the definitions of minimal curb sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991) and minimal
prep sets (Voorneveld, 2004, 2005). Let G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ. A curb set is a
product set X = ×i∈N Xi, where
• for each i ∈ N , Xi ⊆ Ai is a nonempty, compact set of pure strategies;
• for each i ∈ N and each belief α−i of player i with support in X−i, the set Xi
contains all best responses of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N, ∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Xj) : BRi(α−i) ⊆ Xi.
A curb set X is minimal if no curb set is a proper subset of X. Similarly, a prep set is
a product set X = ×i∈N Xi, where
• for each i ∈ N , Xi ⊆ Ai is a nonempty, compact set of pure strategies;
• for each i ∈ N and each belief α−i of player i with support in X−i, the set Xi
contains at least one best response of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Xj) : BRi(α−i) ∩Xi 6= ∅.
A prep set X is minimal if no prep set is a proper subset of X.
3. Sufficient conditions for coincidence
In this section, we show that some simple conditions are sufficient for the collection
of minimal prep sets and the collection of pure Nash equilibria to coincide in a class
of games. This statement is intuitively clear, but since we are comparing set-valued
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solutions with point-valued solutions, let us define the coincidence formally: in a game
G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ, the collection of minimal prep sets and the collection of
pure Nash equilibria coincide if:
• for each minimal prep set X = ×i∈NXi of G and each player i ∈ N , there is a pure
strategy ai ∈ Ai such that Xi = {ai} and a = (ai)i∈N is a pure Nash equilibrium,
and conversely:
• for each pure Nash equilibrium a = (ai)i∈N ∈ A, the product set ×i∈N{ai} is a
minimal prep set.
If Γ′ ⊆ Γ is a class of games, we say that the collection of minimal prep sets and the
collection of pure Nash equilibria coincide on Γ′ if they coincide for each game G ∈ Γ′.
For a game G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ, we will sometimes wish to restrict play-
ers’ pure strategies to a product set B = ×i∈NBi ⊆ A. The game’s payoffs are trivially
obtained by restricting the payoff functions (ui)i∈N to B. With a slight abuse of no-
tation (letting the domain of payoffs be implicit), this subgame of G is denoted by
〈N, (Bi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉.
Let us formulate the conditions under which we will establish coincidence. A class of
games Γ′ ⊆ Γ:
• is closed w.r.t. subgames if for each game G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ′ and
each nonempty product set B = ×i∈NBi ⊆ A of compact action sets Bi ⊆ Ai, also
〈N, (Bi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ′;
• is closed w.r.t. minimal prep sets if for each game G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ′
and each minimal prep set B = ×i∈NBi ⊆ A, also 〈N, (Bi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ′;
• has the pure Nash property if each game G ∈ Γ′ has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Clearly, if Γ′ is closed w.r.t. subgames, it is closed w.r.t. minimal prep sets. Apart
from that, the properties are logically independent: the set of matrix games (i.e., finite,
two-player zero-sum games) is closed w.r.t. subgames and in particular w.r.t. minimal
prep sets, but does not have the pure Nash property. The set of best-response potential
games with a finite pure strategy space (see Section 5.1) has the pure Nash property and
is closed w.r.t. minimal prep sets, but is not closed w.r.t. subgames.
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Proposition 3.1 If Γ′ ⊆ Γ has the pure Nash property and is closed w.r.t. minimal prep
sets, or — more strongly — w.r.t. subgames, then the set of pure Nash equilibria and the
collection of minimal prep sets coincide on Γ′.
Proof. Let G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ′. By the pure Nash property, G has a pure
Nash equilibrium a ∈ A. By definition, ×i∈N{ai} is a minimal prep set. Conversely, let
B = ×i∈NBi be a minimal prep set of G. Since Γ′ is closed w.r.t. minimal prep sets,
also 〈N, (Bi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ′. By the pure Nash property, 〈N, (Bi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 has a
pure Nash equilibrium b = (bi)i∈N ∈ B and hence minimal prep set ×i∈N{bi}. Since B
is a prep set of G, it follows that ×i∈N{bi} is a minimal prep set of the original game G.
Since ×i∈N{bi} ⊆ B and B is a minimal prep set of G, it follows that ×i∈N{bi} = B: the
minimal prep set B corresponds with a pure Nash equilibrium. 
Proposition 3.1 is intuitively most appealing if it applies to a class of games which is
closed w.r.t. subgames, which is regularly the case if the games are defined by common
types of strategic interactions: subgames of zero-sum games are zero-sum, subgames of
congestion games, where players choose among different roads/facilities, are congestion
games, etc. Nevertheless, many interesting classes of games with the pure Nash property
are not closed w.r.t. subgames, even though they are closed w.r.t. minimal prep sets.
Specific examples include the games with strategic complementarities in Section 4.2 and
the best-response potential games in Section 5.1.
A pure saddle-point theorem of Shapley (1964, pp. 6-7) serves as a first illustration of
the use of Proposition 3.1. Other economically relevant applications are provided in later
sections.
Proposition 3.2 Let Γ′ be the set of finite two-person zero-sum games
G = 〈{1, 2}, (A1, A2), (u1,−u1)〉
in which each 2 × 2 subgame (a subgame in which both players have exactly two pure
strategies) has a pure saddle point/Nash equilibrium2. For each game G ∈ Γ′, the set of
pure saddle points/Nash equilibria and the collection of minimal prep sets coincide.
2This assumption holds vacuously for finite two-person zero-sum games in which some player has only
one pure strategy: there are no 2× 2 subgames! Hence, such games are included in Γ′.
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Proof. Let G ∈ Γ′ and let H be a subgame of G. Since each 2 × 2 subgame of H is a
2 × 2 subgame of G, it follows that all 2 × 2 subgames of H have a pure saddle point.
Conclude that Γ′ is closed w.r.t. subgames. Moreover, Γ′ has the pure Nash property by
Thm. 2.1 of Shapley (1964). The result now follows from Proposition 3.1. 
4. Strategic complementarities
Well-known existence results for Nash equilibria in supermodular games or games with
strategic complementarities rely on monotonicity properties of the best-reply correspon-
dence. The theory was initiated by Topkis (1978) and has been successfully applied to
a wide range of economic models; the reader is referred to, for instance, Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) or the book of Topkis (1998). This section relies on a general existence
result by Zhou (1994).
4.1. Lattices and order
A partially ordered set (S,≤) is a set S with a binary relation ≤ which is:
(1) reflexive: ∀x ∈ S : x ≤ x,
(2) antisymmetric: ∀x, y ∈ S : if x ≤ y and y ≤ x, then x = y,
(3) transitive: ∀x, y, z ∈ S : if x ≤ y and y ≤ z, then x ≤ z.
If the partial order ≤ is complete (∀x, y ∈ S : x ≤ y or y ≤ x), it is a linear order.
Let (S,≤) be a partially ordered set and let T ⊆ S. An element x ∈ S is a lower bound
of T if x ≤ y for all y ∈ T and an upper bound of T if y ≤ x for all y ∈ T . If it exists,
the least upper bound of T is called the supremum sup(T ) of T in S and the greatest
lower bound of T is called the infimum inf(T ) of T in S. A lattice is a partially ordered
set (S,≤) that contains the infimum x ∧ y = inf{x, y} and supremum x ∨ y = sup{x, y}
of each pair of elements x, y ∈ S. The lattice is complete if, for all nonempty subsets
T ⊆ S: inf(T ) ∈ S and sup(T ) ∈ S.
(T,≤) is a sublattice of lattice (S,≤) if T ⊆ S is closed under ∧ and ∨, i.e., if it is a
lattice with the same join and meet relations as S. As above, this sublattice is complete
if, for all nonempty subsets U ⊆ T : inf(U) ∈ T and sup(U) ∈ T .
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An interval [x, y] in (S,≤) is the set {z ∈ S | x ≤ z ≤ y}. For x ∈ S, we denote
(−∞, x] = {z ∈ S | z ≤ x} and [x,∞) = {z ∈ S | x ≤ z}. The interval topology on
a lattice (S,≤) is the topology for which all closed sets are intersections or finite unions
of intervals of the form S, (−∞, x], and [x,∞), where x ∈ S. By the Frink-Birkhoff
theorem (see Birkhoff (1967)), a lattice is complete if and only if it is compact in its
interval topology. Hence, any sublattice of a complete lattice is complete if and only if it
is closed in its interval topology.
A note of caution: a subset of (S,≤) that is a complete lattice in its own right may not
be a complete sublattice of (S,≤). Milgrom and Roberts (1990, p. 1260) give enlightening
examples. For instance, the set T = [0, 1) ∪ {2} is a complete lattice under its standard
order. In this case sup[0, 1) = 2 ∈ T . It is not a complete sublattice of [0, 2], where
sup[0, 1) = 1 /∈ T .
Let (S,≤) and (T, -) be two lattices. A correspondence ϕ : S  T is ascending if, for
all s, s′ ∈ S with s ≤ s′, all t ∈ ϕ(s) and t′ ∈ ϕ(s′), it holds that t∧ t′ ∈ ϕ(s), t∨ t′ ∈ ϕ(s′).
4.2. Games with ascending best replies
As stated, well-known existence results for Nash equilibria rely on the best-response
correspondence being ascending. This can be derived from other assumptions under names
like supermodularity/strategic complementarity/increasing differences, but the key to the
result is always the monotonicity of best replies. Therefore, we state our result in terms
of ascending best replies and refer to, for instance, Zhou (1994) for a clear account on
how to achieve it from other conditions.
We use the general existence result by Zhou (1994) with the only modification that
we assume all action sets Ai to be linearly ordered, rather than just a lattice. In most
applications (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, or Topkis, 1998), this assumption is satisfied.
Often, for instance, Ai is a set of real numbers with its usual order.
Recall that a function f : A → R on a topological space A is upper semicontinuous
(u.s.c.) if its upper contour sets are closed:
∀r ∈ R : {a ∈ A | f(a) ≥ r} is closed.
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Proposition 4.1 Let ΓASC be the set of strategic games G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ Γ
satisfying the following conditions:
(ASC1) For each i ∈ N , there is a linear order ≤i on Ai such that Ai is compact in a
topology τi equal to or finer than the interval topology.
(ASC2) For each i ∈ N , ui is upper semicontinuous on Ai in the topology τi.
(ASC3) For each i ∈ N , the best-response correspondence BRi : A−i  Ai is ascending.3
For each game G ∈ ΓASC the collection of minimal prep sets and pure Nash equilibria
coincide.
Proof.
ΓASC has the pure Nash property: All games in ΓASC satisfy the lattice and up-
per semicontinuity properties of Zhou (1994) and the best-response correspondences are
ascending. Hence, by Zhou (1994), each game in ΓASC has a pure Nash equilibrium.
ΓASC is closed w.r.t. minimal prep sets: Let G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ ΓASC and
let B = ×i∈NBi ⊆ A be a minimal prep set of G. To show: H = 〈N, (Bi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈
ΓASC .
(i) Restricting the linear order ≤i on Ai to Bi, we see that (Bi,≤i) is linearly ordered.
(ii) By definition of a minimal prep set, Bi is compact in τi, which is equal to or finer
than the interval topology on Ai. Hence, the same holds for the topology restricted to
Bi, the usual subspace topology.
(iii) Since ui is upper semicontinuous in the topology τi on Ai, it remains so on Bi.
(iv) Since B is a minimal prep set, the best-response correspondence BRHi (·) of the
subgame H is given by
BRHi (·) = Bi ∩BRGi (·),
the — by definition of a minimal prep set — nonempty intersection of the best-response
correspondence of the original game G and i’s component Bi of the minimal prep set.
Since BRGi (·) is ascending and Bi is a lattice given its linear order ≤i, it follows that
BRHi (·) is ascending.
3As usual, A−i is the direct product compact lattice whose product order ≤−i is such that for all
a−i = (aj)j∈N\{i} and b−i = (bj)j∈N\{i} in A−i: a−i ≤−i b−i iff aj ≤j bj for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
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Combining observations (i) to (iv), it follows that 〈N, (Bi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ ΓASC , i.e.,
ΓASC is closed w.r.t. minimal prep sets. The result now follows from Proposition 3.1. 
Remarks:
(i) The set ΓASC in Proposition 4.1 is not closed w.r.t. subgames: in the two-player
game in Figure 1, each player’s action 0 is strictly dominant. Hence, the best-response
0 1 2
0 2, 2 2, 0 2, 0
1 0, 2 1,−1 −1, 1
2 0, 2 −1, 1 1,−1
Figure 1: Supermodular games: not closed w.r.t. subgames
correspondences are constant and in particular ascending in the usual order on {0, 1, 2}:
the game belongs to ΓASC . But the subgame on {1, 2} × {1, 2} is not in ΓASC : it has no
pure Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Proposition 4.1 does not hold if the assumption that each action set Ai is linearly
ordered is relaxed to assuming that there is an order ≤i on Ai such that (Ai,≤i) is a
complete lattice: the associated class of games is not closed w.r.t. minimal prep sets.
Consider the two-player game in Figure 2. Define, for each player i, the partial order ≤i
0 1 2 3
0 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
1 0, 0 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
2 0, 0 0, 1 1, 0 0, 0
3 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 2, 2
Figure 2: Supermodular games: non-linear orders
on Ai = {0, 1, 2, 3} with 0 ≤i 1 ≤i 3 and 0 ≤i 2 ≤i 3, but which does not compare 1 and
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2. Then (Ai,≤i) is a complete lattice. The players’ best-response correspondences are:
BR1(a2) = {a2} for all a2 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and BR2(a1) =

{0} if a1 = 0,
{2} if a1 = 1,
{1} if a1 = 2,
{3} if a1 = 3.
Hence, the best-response correspondences BR1 and BR2 are ascending. The product set
{1, 2}×{1, 2} is a minimal prep set of the game. In the subgame restricted to these action
profiles, we still have that the best response correspondence is (trivially) ascending with
respect to the product order induced by the restriction of ≤i to {1, 2}. But ({1, 2},≤i)
is not a lattice: 1 ∧ 2 and 1 ∨ 2 do not exist. Notice, indeed, that this subgame does not
have a pure Nash equilibrium.
(iii) Recall that a (necessarily pure) Nash equilibrium is strict if each player has a unique
best response to the choices of the remaining players. In generic finite games belonging
to the class of supermodular games studied above, also the collection of minimal curb
sets coincides with the collection of pure and strict Nash equilibria (see Appendix for a
proof):
Proposition 4.2 Let ΓFASC ⊂ ΓASC be the set of all finite games in ΓASC. Generically,
in ΓFASC the collection of minimal prep sets, the collection of minimal curb sets, the
collection of pure Nash equilibria, and the collection of strict Nash equilibria coincide.
This result has an important impact for convergence of adjustment processes: it is within
minimal curb sets that many intuitive models of strategic adjustment settle down; cf.
Young (1993, 1998), Hurkens (1995), Kosfeld et al. (2002). Hence, under the conditions
of Proposition 4.2, these processes converge toward a strict Nash equilibrium.
Although of interest in its own right, many classes of games have additional structure,
making them nongeneric. To illustrate this point, the next subsection describes a subclass
of supermodular games in which minimal prep sets give sharp predictions, whereas mini-
mal curb sets have no cutting power whatsoever and simply consist of the entire strategy
space.
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4.3. A class of coordination games
By Proposition 4.1, minimal prep sets have substantial cutting power in a very general
class of supermodular games. However, one can easily construct plausible subclasses of
such games where minimal curb sets have no cutting power. We give a simple example.
Consider a two-player coordination game where the players find each other if they
choose close-by alternatives. Formally, consider the game G = 〈{1, 2}, (A1, A2), (u1, u2)〉
where
A1 = A2 = {0, 1, . . . , k} for some k ∈ N (1)
and for each pair of alternatives (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2:
u1(a1, a2) = u2(a1, a2) =
 1 if |a1 − a2| ≤ 1,0 otherwise, (2)
i.e., the players choose a location 0, . . . , k and are rewarded (‘find each other’) if they
choose identical or neighboring locations.
Proposition 4.3 In a two-player coordination game G = 〈{1, 2}, (A1, A2), (u1, u2)〉 as in
(1) and (2), the following hold:
(a) the collections of pure Nash equilibria and minimal prep sets coincide;
(b) the collection of pure Nash equilibria is
{(a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2 : |a1 − a2| ≤ 1};
(c) the unique (hence minimal) curb set is A1 × A2.
Proof. (a) Endowing the action space Ai = {0, 1, . . . , k} of player i ∈ {1, 2} with its
standard order, the game is easily seen to belong to the class of games with ascending best
responses in Proposition 4.1, so that pure Nash equilibria and minimal prep sets indeed
coincide.
(b) Follows easily from (2).
(c) Let X = X1 ×X2 be a curb set of G. Fix a player i ∈ {1, 2}. By (2), it follows that
if ai ∈ Xi, then {ai − 1, ai, ai + 1} ∩ {0, 1, . . . , k} ⊆ Xj for j 6= i: player j’s component
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of the curb set contains not only ai, but also the neighboring actions. The only set with
this property is A1 × A2. 
5. Potential games
5.1. Generalized ordinal and best-response potential games
Monderer and Shapley (1996) define four classes of potential games, in increasing
order of generality: exact, weighted, ordinal, and generalized ordinal potential games.
These games have applications to, for instance, congestion models (Rosenthal, 1973) and
oligopoly models (Slade, 1994). All finite potential games in Monderer and Shapley (1996)
have the following finite improvement property: start with an arbitrary strategy profile.
Each time, let a player that can benefit from unilateral deviation switch to a better
strategy. Under the finite improvement property, this process eventually ends, obviously
in a Nash equilibrium. Voorneveld (2000) introduces best-response potential games that
allow infinite improvement paths by imposing restrictions only on paths in which players
that can improve actually deviate to a best response. These games include the best-
response potential games of Morris and Ui (2004, p. 264, after Def. 6). Formally, a game
G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 is
• a generalized ordinal potential game if there is a function P : A → R such
that, for each player i ∈ N , each strategy profile a−i ∈ A−i of his fellow players, and
each pair of strategies ai, bi ∈ Ai:
ui(ai, a−i)− ui(bi, a−i) > 0 ⇒ P (ai, a−i)− P (bi, a−i) > 0. (3)
• a best-response potential game if there is a function P : A → R such that, for
each player i ∈ N and each strategy profile a−i ∈ A−i of his fellow players:
arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, a−i) = arg max
ai∈Ai
P (ai, a−i). (4)
The function P is called a (generalized ordinal or best-response) potential.
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There is no logical dependence between (3) and (4): Examples 4.1 and 4.2 in Voor-
neveld (2000) indicate that there are generalized ordinal potential games which are not
best-response potential games, and conversely, that there are best-response potential
games which are not generalized ordinal potential games.
Proposition 5.1 Let ΓGOP and ΓBRP be the set of games with compact strategy spaces
and an upper semicontinuous generalized ordinal or best-response potential, respectively.
For each G ∈ ΓGOP ∪ ΓBRP , the set of pure Nash equilibria and the collection of minimal
prep sets coincide.
Proof.
ΓGOP is closed w.r.t. subgames: Simply restrict the domain of the potential function.
ΓBRP is closed w.r.t. minimal prep sets: Let G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 ∈ ΓBRP
have u.s.c. best-response potential P and assume B = ×i∈NBi is a minimal prep set of
G. For each player i ∈ N and each strategy profile a−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}Bj,
∅ 6= arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, a−i) ∩Bi = arg max
ai∈Ai
P (ai, a−i) ∩Bi,
where the inequality follows by definition of a prep set and the equality follows from (4).
Hence, also the game H = 〈N, (Bi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 is a best-response potential game, with
a best response potential obtained from P by restricting its domain. Its strategy spaces
(Bi)i∈N are compact by definition of a prep set and P remains u.s.c. in the subspace
topology. Conclude that H ∈ ΓBRP .
ΓGOP and ΓBRP have the pure Nash property: Since A is compact in the product
topology and each G ∈ ΓGOP ∪ ΓBRP has an upper semicontinuous potential P , the
potential achieves a maximum. By (3) or (4), such a maximum is a pure Nash equilibrium.
The result now follows from Proposition 3.1. 
Remarks:
(i) Endowing A with the discrete topology, the conclusion of Proposition 5.1 applies in
particular to finite generalized ordinal/best-response potential games.
(ii) As opposed to the set of generalized ordinal potential games, the set of best-response
potential games is not closed w.r.t. subgames: The two-player game to the left in Figure
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3 has a best-response potential (to the right). The subgame with action space {T, B} ×
{M, R} is not a best-response potential game: such a potential would have to satisfy
P (T, M) < P (T,R) < P (B, R) < P (B, M) < P (T, M),
a contradiction.
L M R
T 2, 2 1, 0 0, 1
B 0, 0 0, 1 1, 0
L M R
T 4 3 0
B 0 2 1
Figure 3: Best-response potential games: not closed w.r.t. subgames.
(iii) The assumption that the game needs to have an u.s.c. potential is not an innocuous
one. Voorneveld (1997, p. 167-168) gives an example of an ordinal potential game with
compact strategy spaces and continuous payoff functions for which no potential achieves
a maximum and which, consequently, has no u.s.c. potential.
(iv) The conclusion of Proposition 5.1 does not hold for the pseudo-potential games re-
cently introduced by Dubey et al. (2004). Formally, a game G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 is
a pseudo-potential game if there is a function P : A → R such that, for each player i ∈ N
and each strategy profile a−i ∈ A−i of his fellow players:
arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, a−i) ⊇ arg max
ai∈Ai
P (ai, a−i).
The two-player game to the left in Figure 4 has a pseudo-potential (to the right). But
its pure Nash equilibria and minimal prep sets do not coincide, since {T,B} × {A, B}
is a minimal prep set. The game has neither a generalized ordinal nor a best-response
potential function P , which by definition would have to satisfy:
P (T, A) < P (T, B) < P (B, B) < P (B, A) < P (T,A),
A B C D
T 1,−1 −1, 1 1, 1 −2,−2
B −1, 1 1,−1 −2,−2 1, 1
A B C D
T 1 0 2 0
B 0 1 0 2
Figure 4: A pseudo-potential game
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a contradiction.
(v) As we showed for supermodular games, also in generic finite generalized ordinal/best-
response potential games, the collection of minimal curb sets and the collection of pure
(and strict) Nash equilibria coincide (see Appendix for a proof):
Proposition 5.2 In generic finite generalized ordinal or best-response potential games,
the collection of minimal prep sets, the collection of minimal curb sets, the collection of
pure Nash equilibria, and the collection of strict Nash equilibria coincide.
Again, we note that under the conditions of the previous Proposition, adjustment processes
as in Young (1993, 1998), Hurkens (1995), and Kosfeld et al. (2002) converge toward a
strict Nash equilibrium.
5.2. Minority games
Above, we saw that in large classes of potential games, minimal prep sets have sub-
stantial cutting power, yielding equilibrium predictions. On the one hand, we have shown
that in finite generic potential games, the collection of minimal curb sets and the collec-
tion of minimal prep sets coincide. On the other hand, just as for supermodular games,
in economically relevant subclasses of these games, minimal curb sets have no cutting
power whatsoever. As an example, this section considers so-called minority games, a
type of congestion problems introduced by Challet and Zhang (1997) and inspired by the
El Farol Bar problem of Arthur (1994). See Moro (2003) for an introductory overview,
Challet et al. (2004) for a book containing many of the path-breaking papers within the
physics literature and applications to phenomena in financial markets, and Coolen (2005)
for a thorough mathematical treatment.
A minority game is a congestion problem where players aim to avoid crowds and pre-
fer choosing the minority alternative. It has an odd number of players: N = {1, . . . , 2k+1}
for some k ∈ N. Each player i ∈ N chooses among two actions: Ai = {−1, +1} for all
i ∈ N . For each action s ∈ {−1, +1} there is a function
fs : {1, . . . , 2k + 1} → R,
where, for each m ∈ {1, . . . , 2k + 1}, the number fs(m) ∈ R specifies the utility/payoff to
a player choosing s if the total number of players choosing s equals m. The payoff/utility
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function ui : A → R of player i ∈ N is consequently defined as follows:
∀a = (aj)j∈N ∈ A : ui(a) = fai(| {j ∈ N : aj = ai} |).
Characteristic for a minority game is the assumption that unilateral deviation from a
majority to a minority pays off:
∀s, t ∈ {−1, +1}, s 6= t,∀m ∈ {k + 2, . . . , 2k + 1} : fs(m) < ft(2k + 2−m). (5)
Example 5.3 Challet and Zhang (1997, p. 408), who introduce minority games, initially
assign payoff one to each member of the minority, and payoff zero to each member of a
majority:
f−1(m) = f+1(m) =
 1 if m ∈ {1, . . . , k},0 if m ∈ {k + 1, . . . , 2k + 1}. (6)
In a variant (Challet and Zhang, 1997, p. 411), they suggest payoffs giving zero reward
to majority members and positive payoffs to minorities, favoring small ones:
f−1(m) = f+1(m) =
 | N | /m− 2 if m ∈ {1, . . . , k},0 if m ∈ {k + 1, . . . , 2k + 1}. (7)
Given an action profile a = (ai)i∈N , the minority alternative is −1 if
∑
i∈N ai > 0 and +1
if
∑
i∈N ai < 0. Other frequently occurring payoff functions (Moro, 2003) assign to player
i a payoff given by −ai g(
∑
j∈N aj), where g is an odd function, i.e., g(x) = −g(−x), with
g(x) > 0 if x > 0. In particular, common examples include
g(x) = x/|N | and g(x) = sgn(x), (8)
where the sign function is defined for each x ∈ R as:
sgn(x) =

−1 if x < 0,
0 if x = 0,
+1 if x > 0.
In our notation:
f−1(m) = f+1(m) = g(2(k −m) + 1). (9)
/
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As is seen from the examples, the payoff functions to the two alternatives are traditionally
assumed to be identical: f−1 = f+1. We relax this assumption by only requiring
f−1(k + 1) = f+1(k + 1). (10)
Proposition 5.4 In a minority game G (in particular, under assumptions (5) and (10))
with 2k + 1 players, the following holds:
(a) G is a potential game, so its pure Nash equilibria and minimal prep sets coincide;
(b) A pure strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there is an alternative
s ∈ {−1, +1} chosen by exactly k players;
(c) The unique minimal curb set of G is the entire pure strategy space.
Proof. (a) G is a congestion game as in Rosenthal (1973) and hence a (finite exact)
potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Thm. 3.1). By Proposition 5.1, its pure
Nash equilibria and minimal prep sets coincide.
(b) Fix a pure strategy profile. The number of players is odd, so some option s ∈ {−1, +1}
is chosen by a majority of at least k +1 players. If the majority has k +2 or more players,
(5) implies that a majority member can unilaterally deviate to the other option and
achieve a strictly higher payoff. Thus, the strategy profiles in Proposition 5.4(b) are the
only candidates for pure Nash equilibria. They are indeed equilibria: by (5), a minority
member never has an incentive to deviate and join a majority. Next, let s ∈ {−1, +1} be
the alternative chosen by the k + 1 majority members. If a majority member deviates to
t 6= s, his payoff changes from fs(k + 1) to ft(k + 1). By (10), these payoffs are the same.
Conclude: the profiles in Proposition 5.4(b) are indeed the game’s pure Nash equilibria.
(c) Let B = ×i∈NBi be a minimal curb set of G. There is a player i ∈ N with Bi =
{−1, +1}. Otherwise, all components of the minimal curb set would be singleton sets. By
definition of a curb set, the unique pure strategy profile in B would then have to be a pure
Nash equilibrium, as characterized in Proposition 5.4(b). But in a pure Nash equilibrium,
by (10), the minority members are indifferent between staying and switching: both −1
and +1 are best replies to the action profile of the remaining players, which consequently
must be included in their component of the curb set. This contradicts that all components
of the minimal curb set are singletons. Conclude: there is an i ∈ N with Bi = {−1, +1}.
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We proceed by showing that Bj = {−1, +1} for each j ∈ N . Suppose, to the contrary,
that there is a player j ∈ N with Bj being a singleton set, w.l.o.g. Bj = {−1}. By
definition of a curb set, there is no element of B−j against which +1 is a best reply. Since
+1 is a best reply to any profile in which at most k players choose +1, no such profiles
can be included in B−j: in each element of B−j, at least k + 1 players choose +1, in
particular in each profile where player i, who had Bi = {−1, +1}, chooses −1. Hence, in
each element of ×`∈N\{i,j}B`, at least k + 1 players choose +1: there are at least k + 1
players in N \ {i, j} whose component of the minimal curb set B equals {+1}.
Let b−i ∈ B−i and let ` ≥ k + 1 be the number of players j ∈ N \ {i} with bj = +1.
Player i’s payoff is f+1(` + 1) or f−1(2k − ` + 1) for actions +1 and −1, respectively. By
(5) with m = ` + 1, player i’s unique best reply to any b−i ∈ B−i is to choose −1:
f+1(` + 1) < f−1(2k − ` + 1),
Hence, the same holds for each belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Bj): action +1 can be omitted
from his component Bi of the curb set, contradicting the assumption that B is a minimal
curb set. Conclude: there is no player j ∈ N with Bj being a singleton set, proving
Proposition 5.4(c). 
5.3. An extension to the Quint-Shubik congestion model
Monderer and Shapley (1996, Thm 3.2) show that each finite exact potential game is
isomorphic to a congestion game as defined in Rosenthal (1973). In these games, players
choose subsets of facilities from a common pool. The payoff associated with each facility
is a function only of the number of players using it. Quint and Shubik (1994) and — as
a special case — Milchtaich (1996) considered a different class of congestion games by
allowing payoffs to be player-dependent. In general, these games do not admit a potential
function, but nevertheless have pure Nash equilibria. The notation in this section follows
the overview article on congestion models by Voorneveld et al. (2000).
Quint and Shubik (1994) consider finite games G = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 satisfying
the following three properties:
(QS1) There is a nonempty, finite set F of facilities such that Ai ⊆ F for all i ∈ N .
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By (QS1), an action of a player is to choose a facility from a collection F , possibly subject
to feasibility constraints: players may not have access to all elements of F .
Let a ∈ A, f ∈ F . Let nf (a) := |{i ∈ N : ai = f}| be the number of players choosing
facility f in action profile a.
(QS2) For each player i ∈ N and all pure strategy profiles a, b ∈ A with ai = bi = f : if
nf (a) = nf (b), then ui(a) = ui(b).
By (QS2), the utility of player i depends only on the number of users of his chosen facility.
(QS3) For each player i ∈ N , each pure strategy profile a ∈ A, each player j ∈ N \ {i}
with aj = ai, and each alternative action choice bj ∈ Aj \ {aj} of this player:
ui(aj, a−j) ≤ ui(bj, a−j).
Property (QS3) models the congestion: a player is not harmed if an other user of the same
facility switches to a different one. The benefit to each player from choosing a facility is
weakly decreasing in the total number of users.
Proposition 5.5 Let ΓQS be the set of Quint-Shubik congestion games, i.e., the set of
games satisfying (QS1) to (QS3). For each game G ∈ ΓQS, the set of pure Nash equilibria
and the collection of minimal prep sets coincide.
Proof. Quint and Shubik (1994, Thm. 3) prove that ΓQS has the pure Nash property.
Property (QS1) allows us to restrict the set of facilities from which players make their
choices: ΓQS is closed w.r.t. subgames. The result follows from Proposition 3.1. 
Remark 5.6 Milchtaich (1996) allows no restrictions on access to facilities: he assumes
(QS2), (QS3), and Ai = F instead of the weaker assumption (QS1). Hence, his class of
games is not closed w.r.t. subgames or minimal prep sets. Since they are special cases of
the Quint-Shubik congestion games, we can nevertheless conclude that minimal prep sets
and pure Nash equilibria coincide. /
The Quint-Shubik congestion games contain numerous minority games, including all our
examples with payoffs as defined in (6), (7), and (9) with g as in (8). Conclude that also
here, there is a relevant subclass in which minimal curb sets have no cutting power.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of the genericity results in Propositions 4.2 and 5.2. Recall (Aubin
and Ekeland, 1984, pp. 8-9) that in a topological space a property is generic if the set of points where it
is not true is contained in a countable union of closed, nowhere dense4 sets. In what follows, fix a finite
player set N with |N | ≥ 2 (to avoid trivialities), and for each i ∈ N a nonempty, finite set Ai of pure
strategies. A game is then identified by its vector u = (ui)i∈N of payoffs functions ui : A → R, a vector
in the finite-dimensional Euclidean space R|N |×|A|, endowed with its standard topology. For each i ∈ N ,
let BRui : A−i  Ai denote player i’s best-response correspondence in the game u.
Proof. (Proposition 4.2) Let SUP ⊂ R|N |×|A| be the subset of finite games satisfying (ASC1) to
(ASC3), endowed with the subset topology. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1. Let u ∈ SUP . By Proposition 4.1, the fact that each minimal curb set of u contains a minimal
prep set, and the definitions of the solution concepts, the following two statements are equivalent:
(a) The collection of minimal prep sets of u coincides with the collection of minimal curb sets of u;
(b) Each pure Nash equilibrium of u is strict.
To prove Proposition 4.2, it therefore suffices to show that statement (b) is generically true in SUP . For
each action profile a∗ ∈ A, define the set of games
S(a∗) = {u ∈ SUP | a∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium but not a strict Nash equilibrium of u}.
Each S(a∗) is shown to be closed (Step 2) and nowhere dense (Step 3) in SUP . By the above, the set
of games u ∈ SUP where Proposition 4.2 does not hold is contained in ∪a∈A S(a), the countable (indeed
finite) union of closed, nowhere dense sets, finishing the proof.
Step 2. Let a∗ ∈ A. Then S(a∗) is closed in SUP .
Action profile a∗ is a pure Nash equilibrium of u if and only if the statement P (u) is true:
P (u) : ∀i ∈ N : ui(a∗) = max
bi∈Ai
ui(bi, a∗−i).
Similarly, a∗ is not a strict Nash equilibrium of u if and only if the statement T (u) is true:
T (u) : ∃i ∈ N,∃ci ∈ Ai \ {a∗i } : ui(ci, a∗−i) = max
bi∈Ai
ui(bi, a∗−i).
4A set is nowhere dense if the interior of its closure is empty.
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Let (vm)m∈N be a sequence in S(a∗) with limit v ∈ SUP . We show that v ∈ S(a∗). Taking limits, the
fact that P (vm) holds for each m ∈ N immediately implies that P (v) holds.
Next, we show that T (v) holds. For each m ∈ N, there is a player i(m) ∈ N and an action ci(m) ∈
Ai \ {a∗i } making T (vm) true. By finiteness of N and A and by switching to a subsequence if necessary,
we may assume without loss of generality that there is a player k ∈ N and an action ck ∈ Ak \ {a∗k} such








Taking limits, T (v) holds. Since both P (v) and T (v) hold, v ∈ S(a∗), proving Step 2.
Step 3. Let a∗ ∈ A. Then S(a∗) is nowhere dense in SUP .
Since S(a∗) is closed, this is equivalent with the statement that its interior is empty. Suppose, to the
contrary, that there exists a game u ∈ S(a∗) and an open neighborhood B of u such that u′ ∈ S(a∗) for
each u′ ∈ B. We derive a contradiction.
Let ε > 0. Define a perturbed game uε as follows. For each i ∈ N and a ∈ A:
uεi (a) =
 ui(a) + ε if ai = sup BRui (a−i),ui(a) otherwise.
Each Ai is finite and linearly ordered, so the supremum is achieved. For each i ∈ N and a−i ∈ A−i:
BRu
ε
i (a−i) = {supBRui (a−i)}. Since BRui is ascending by assumption, the same holds for BRu
ε
i . Indeed,
for each i ∈ N and a−i, b−i ∈ A−i, if a−i ≤−i b−i, then
supBRui (a−i) ≤i supBRui (a−i) ∨ supBRui (b−i) ≤i supBRui (b−i),
where the first ordering follows by definition of ∨ and the second one from the fact that supBRui (a−i) ∈
BRui (a−i), supBR
u
i (b−i) ∈ BRui (b−i), and from BRui being ascending. Hence, uε ∈ SUP . But uε /∈





−i) for each i ∈ N , then a∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium of uε. However, for ε > 0
sufficiently small, uε ∈ B, a contradiction. 
Proof. (Proposition 5.2) We do not provide a complete proof: it follows the same three steps as the
proof of Proposition 4.2. In Step 3 of the proof, let ε > 0 and define a perturbed game uε = (uεi )i∈N of
a potential game u as follows. For each i ∈ N and a ∈ A:
uεi (a) =
 ui(a) + ε if a = a∗,ui(a) otherwise.
If the game u has a generalized ordinal/best-response potential P , then the game uε has a generalized
ordinal/best-response potential given, for each a ∈ A by
P ε(a) =
 P (a) + κ if a = a∗,P (a) otherwise,
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with κ > 0 such that κ > maxi∈N,bi∈Ai
(
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